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INTRODUCTION
Technology transfer occurs when the owner of a technology
grants access to that technology to another party.1 Today, companies consider technologies—as opposed to physical assets—the
most important business assets that are directly tied to their products’ competitiveness.2 Intellectual property (“IP”) law protects
those technologies.
One type of technology transfer is contract manufacturing,
where foreign companies employ Chinese companies to manufacture products for the Chinese markets.3 Contract manufacturing is
beneficial to foreign companies because it saves them shipping
costs and time.4 To facilitate contract manufacturing in China,
however, foreign companies—often the owners of the technologies—must authorize Chinese companies access to their proprietary technologies.5 Another type of technology transfer—foreign
direct investment (“FDI”)—involves foreign companies setting up
business entities in China, either as joint venture partners with
Chinese companies or as wholly-owned subsidiaries.6 Under FDI,
foreign companies maintain a lasting ownership and control over
their proprietary technologies.7 For FDI to operate successfully,
foreign companies must transfer their proprietary technologies to
their business entities in China.8
In 2002, China implemented a provision in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) Regulations on Administration of Technology Import and Export (“2002 Technology Regulations”),9

1

See Daniel C.K. Chow, A Comparison of EU and China Competition Laws That Apply
to Technology Transfer Agreements, 9 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 497, 497 (2014).
2
See id. at 500.
3
See id. at 501.
4
See id.
5
See id.
6
See id. at 502.
7
See id.
8
See id.
9
Regulations on Administration of Import and Export of Technologies (promulgated
by the St. Council, Dec. 10, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), CLI.2.38107(EN)
(Lawinfochina), art. 27 [hereinafter 2002 Technology Regulations].
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mandating that licensees10 own the improvements they make to
proprietary technologies to which the licensees receive authorized
access11 (hereinafter referred to as the “prohibition on grant-back
clauses”). Often, foreign licensors include grant-back clauses in
their licensing agreements, providing that the foreign licensors own
any improvements to the technology made by the Chinese licensees. Notably, however, the 2002 Technology Regulations prohibit
such grant-back clauses imposed by foreign licensors.12
China’s grant-back regime is outdated and should be updated
with the following proposed policy changes: China should
(1) continue to prohibit grant-back clauses on severable improvements, which can be used without using the original licensed patent; (2) make grant-back clauses on non-severable improvements
non-mandatory, and subject potential abuse of non-mandatory
grant-back clauses to the rule of reason under antitrust law;
(3) apply its grant-back rule to domestic and foreign companies
equally and fairly; and (4) reform its grant-back regime now, rather
than later.
Prior to reaching these solutions, this Note first discusses how
China’s prohibition on grant-back clauses affects its technology
transfer, with an emphasis on empirical data. Then, this Note examines China’s current grant-back regulations and compares them
with China’s regulatory regimes in other related areas, as well as
grant-back regimes in the United States and the European Union.

10

A licensee is one to whom a license is granted. Licensee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). In this Note, a licensee refers to the party to which access to a technology
is granted.
11
See Chow, supra note 1, at 518–19.
12
See id. at 519; 2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 9.
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I. EMPIRICAL DATA: HOW THE CURRENT GRANT-BACK
REGIME AFFECTS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS
IN CHINA
A. Statistics
1. IP Licensing in China Is Growing Fast
Table I below shows that the number of patent licensing contracts increased drastically from 2005 to 2009. This data is extracted from the Patent Licensing Contract Record, which was implemented by the State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s
Republic of China (“SIPO”) in 2002.13 Although a patent license
agreement would nonetheless remain valid without recordation, it
is the best practice for a foreign company to record its patent license agreement in China in order to remit royalties overseas.14
Therefore, this data is the best available to reflect the level of patent licensing activities in China.15
Table I. Patent Licensing Contracts16
Year
Number of
Contracts

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

274

113

n/a

187

8,350

12,403

According to the International Licensing Industry Merchandisers’ Association, the Chinese licensing market grew from $1.1 bil-

13

See Toshiya Watanabe, Recent Increase in Patent Licensing in China and Its Effect on
South–South Technology Transfer, TECH MONITOR, May–June 2011, at 31, 32
http://www.techmonitor.net/tm/images/4/4c/11may_jun_sf3.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
8MEZ-K29Y].
14
See Licensing and Technology Transfer, CHINA IPR SME HELPDESK,
http://www.china-iprhelpdesk.eu/content/licensing-and-technology-transfer
[https://perma.cc/K89R-XKV6] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
15
See Watanabe, supra note 13, at 32.
16
Paik Saber, Assistant Gen. Counsel, IBM Asia Pacific, Patent Litigation and
Licensing in China (Few Practical Considerations) (Mar. 10, 2011) (on file with author).
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lion in 2005 to $3.9 billion by 2010, representing a 25% year-overyear growth.17
2. China Is Currently “Under-Licensed” in Technology
Transfer with the United States
Graphs I and II below show licensing revenues from 2006 to
2012, based on U.S. census data.18 The blue line in Graph I shows
that, in 2012, the United States received a little less than $5 billion
from China. Although China has seen an upward trend in licensing
receipts, as the red line shows (about $500 million in 2012), the
number of China’s licensing receipts was much less than that of the
United States.
However, this data might deviate from the actual licensing revenues given the different pricing methods that companies adopt
when recording licensing revenues with the U.S. Census Bureau.
Thus, the comparison of the same data for Japan and the United
States in Graph II might be more meaningful than the stand-alone
data in Graph I. In 2012, Japan almost balanced the imports and
exports in technology transfer with the United States.19 Assuming
the same behavior by the United States in importing technologies
from both China and Japan, the comparison of Graphs I and II suggests that China is “under-licensed” with the United States.20
Such under-licensing is especially striking considering the large
trade deficit the United States has with China.21 As a result, China’s under-licensed status indicates that Chinese technology export is an area with high economic growth potential.22

17

See Hao Zhan, SAIC Moves Closer to Antitrust Rules for Intellectual Property, INT’L L.
OFF. (July 31, 2014), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=
f8cbb0d5-6d93-4b19-b972-5a06cc0c92d1 [http://perma.cc/E5KT-2SDF].
18
See Mark Cohen, Special Counsel, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Licensing
Impediments: Key Considerations for China-U.S. Technology Transfer (Jan. 7, 2015) (on
file with author).
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
The U.S. trade deficit with China was $365.7 billion in 2015, which is a new record.
U.S. China Trade Deficit: Causes, Effects and Solution, ABOUT.COM, http://useconomy.about
.com/od/tradepolicy/p/us-china-trade.htm [http://perma.cc/6DUS-JBED] (last visited
Mar. 13, 2016).
22
See infra Section I.A.4.
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Graph I. Licensing Revenues: China and the United States23

Graph II. Licensing Revenues: Japan and the United States24

3. Almost All Licensing Activities in China Involve Foreign
Companies
As of 2010, out of a total of 18,348 patent license transfers recorded in the Patent Licensing Contract Record, only 33 (0.17%)
23
24

See Cohen, supra note 18.
Id.
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transfer technologies from Chinese companies to other Chinese
companies, as opposed to foreign companies.25
4. China Strives to Transform from a Technology Import
Economy to a Technology Export Economy
China is traditionally a major technology import country; in
2014, with inflows at an estimated $128 billion, China became the
world’s largest recipient of FDI.26 Significantly, as the global FDI
declined by 8% to an estimated $1.26 trillion, inflows to China nevertheless rose by about 3% in 2014.27
The Chinese government has taken numerous steps to encourage both Chinese and foreign companies to possess legal ownership
of original technologies.28 In 2008, the Chinese government required high-tech companies to possess a patent or receive the exclusive patent license in order to receive grant money and tax exemptions.29 On a global level, China is expected to transfer more
technology in the future to facilitate the growth of Least Developed
Countries (“LDC”).30 For example, in 2006, Chinese government
supported the launch of the South–South Global Assets and Technology Exchange, which provides service to support technology
transfer to LDCs.31 Other previous technology exports from China
to developing countries include China’s Kpatawee Rice Project in
Liberia in 1993 and technology transfer to boost food production in
the China–Africa Cooperation Framework in 2007.32
5. Economic Data on IP Licensing Is Scarce
The Chinese government has not released any specific data on
the grant-back regime specifically, making it difficult to directly
25

See Watanabe, supra note 13, at 35.
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Global FDI Flows Declined in
2014: China Becomes the World’s Top FDI Recipient 2 (Jan. 29, 2015),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2015d1_en.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VL9H-H99N].
27
See id. at 1–2.
28
Watanabe, supra note 13, at 35.
29
Id.
30
See id. at 31.
31
See id.
32
See id. at 35.
26
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study how China’s current grant-back regime affects China in an
economic sense. In contrast, many economic analyses have revealed that grant-back clauses are sometimes pro-competitive and
sometimes anti-competitive.33 Therefore, the absence of economic
data on China’s grant-back regime suggests that this issue is worth
further exploring and has room for reform.
B. High-Profile Deal: High-Speed Rail
Since China first entered into the high-speed rail (“HSR”)
market in 2003, China has progressed from a HSR novice to the
host of the world’s largest high-speed network.34 Indeed, China’s
HSR network spans more than 7,450 miles, far ahead of its nearest
competitor, Spain, whose HSR network measures 1,925 miles.35
Through technology transfer and reverse-engineering, China was
able to become “the world’s high-speed hot spot” in a little over a
decade.36 China required foreign companies that entered into the
Chinese HSR market early to transfer their technology to their
Chinese partners.37 For example, in 2004, Kawasaki Heavy Industries (a Japanese company) transferred HSR technology to China
South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation Limited (“CSR”)
in a deal worth $740 million at the time.38 Also, in 2005, Siemens, a
German company, transferred its HSR technology to China CNR
Corporation Limited.39 Almost a decade later, the tables have
turned: today, CSR is exporting its own HSR technology, and CNR
is competing with Siemens for international contracts.40
Indeed, China’s state-guided industry quickly took the technology, improved it to create domestic designs, and then re-entered
the international market to meaningfully compete for lucrative
33

See infra Section III.B.1.
See Chris Lo, China’s Fast Track to High-Speed Rail Exports, RAILWAY TECH. (Oct.
13, 2014), http://www.railway-technology.com/features/featurechinas-fast-track-to-high
-speed-rail-exports-4401625/ [https://perma.cc/2LR2-GGFR].
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See id.
38
See Mukul Raheja, The Phenomenon of “Technology Transfer”: Lessons from China,
SCI. TECH. & SECURITY F. (May 17, 2014), http://stsfor.org/content/phenomenontechnology-transfer-lessons-china [http://perma.cc/L7Y5-T62A].
39
See id.
40
See id.
34
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deals.41 In 2005, the China Railway Construction Corporation and
China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation won
the contract to build an HSR line in Turkey.42 This HSR line, inaugurated in 2014, spans 330 miles between Istanbul and Ankara in
three and a half hours at speeds up to 155 miles per hour.43 Turkey’s Ankara–Istanbul line is just one of several Chinese HSR
projects, as Chinese companies have signed or are negotiating HSR
contracts in several other countries, including Saudi Arabia, Hungary, and Serbia.44
In the past, most foreign companies willingly complied with
China’s restrictive technology transfer regulations to gain access to
the country’s massive population of consumers with disposable
income.45 The president of Bombardier China (a Canadian aerospace and transportation company) said in 2009, “Whatever technology Bombardier has, whatever the China market needs, there is
no need to ask.”46 Still, despite the benefit of the Chinese market,
grievances over intellectual property matters from these foreign
companies have emerged.47 Kawasaki has publicly complained that
CSR’s HSR technology is based on Kawasaki’s design and has
threatened to sue CSR if it exports that design.48 Similarly, in 2010,
executives from Siemens complained directly to the then-Premier
Wen Jiabao about the rules that compel foreign companies to transfer their technologies to Chinese companies in order to gain access
to the Chinese market.49

41

See Lo, supra note 34.
See id.
43
See Amy Qin, China Exports High-Speed Rail Technology to Turkey, N.Y. TIMES (July
28, 2014, 7:14 AM), http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/china-exportshigh-speed-rail-technology-to-turkey/ [https://perma.cc/3BDM-DJQ9]; Lo, supra note
34.
44
See Lo, supra note 34.
45
See Raheja, supra note 38.
46
See Lo, supra note 34.
47
See Raheja, supra note 38.
48
See id.
49
See id.
42
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II. THE CURRENT REGIME OF PROHIBITION ON GRANTBACK CLAUSES50
A. Legislation and Regulations
China’s grant-back regime is scattered throughout several authorities, including the 2002 Technology Regulations,51 Contract
Law of the PRC (“Contract Law”),52 Provisions on the Prohibition
of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition (“IP Rights Guidelines”),53 and the National
Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and
Technology (“MLP”).54
1. The PRC Regulations on the Administration of the Import
and Export of Technologies
The Ministry of Commerce’s55 (“MOFCOM”) predecessor,
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, promulgated the 2002 Technology Regulations.56 The 2002 Technology
Regulations apply specifically to technology imports into and ex-

50

Chinese courts have not issued any judicial decisions related to China’s mandatory
grant-back regime, limiting this paper’s discussion to the statutory language. Section
III.A.2 discusses antitrust decisions on licensing practices.
51
2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 12.
52
See Zhongguo Renmin Gong he Guo Hetongfa (中华人民共和国合同法) [Contract Law
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15,
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Contract Law].
53
See State Council of the People's Republic of China, The National Medium- and
Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020) (Feb.
2006), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm [https://perma.cc/
A99K-AWB2], translated at U. Sydney, http://sydney.edu.au/global-health/inter
national-networks/National_Outline_for_Medium_and_Long_Term_ST_Develop
ment1.doc [https://perma.cc/QUH3-KXC6] [hereinafter IP Rights Guidelines].
54
See The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology
Development (2006–2020), ST. COUNCIL PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA (Feb. 2006),
http://sydney.edu.au/global-health/international-networks/National_Outline_for_
Medium_and_Long_Term_ST_Development1.doc [https://perma.cc/QUH3-KXC6]
[hereinafter MLP for Science and Technology Development].
55
The Ministry of Commerce is an executive agency of the State Council of China that
regulates foreign trade and investment. See Dingding Tina Wang, Note, When Antitrust
Met WTO: Why U.S. Courts Should Consider U.S.–China WTO Disputes in Deciding
Antitrust Cases Involving Chinese Exports, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1113 (2012).
56
2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 12.
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ports out of China.57 A technology import occurs, for example,
when a foreign company that owns technology registers a patent for
the same technology in China.58
Article 27 of the 2002 Technology Regulations provides: “During the valid term of a technology import contract, the fruits of improvements to the technology shall belong to the party making the
improvements.”59 This language is often referred to as the “prohibition on grant-back clauses” because the provision mandates that
improvements belong to the party making the improvements, without exception.60 The prohibition on grant-back clauses only applies
to technology import contracts, and not to technology export contracts,61 which is notable since China is currently a predominantly
technology import economy.62
2. The PRC Contract Law and the Judicial Interpretation
Article 345 of the Contract Law, promulgated in 1999, provides
that the transferor of a patent licensing contract shall, according to
the terms of the contract, permit the transferee to exploit the patent.63 Under the Contract Law, in the absence of a grant-back
clause in a contract, if the intent of the parties cannot be determined by other conduct, the improvement belongs to neither the
licensee nor the licensor.64 This prohibition on grant-back clauses
conflicts with the prohibition on grant-back clauses under the 2002
Technology Regulations.65
The Contract Law is a law of general application, but specifically provides for technology transfer contracts.66 Still, the 2002
Technology Regulations, which were enacted three years after the
57

Id. at art. 2.
See id.
59
See id. at art. 27 (emphasis added).
60
See id.
61
See id. at art. 2.
62
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 26; see also discussion
supra Section I.A.4 on China’s recent initiatives intended to transform from a technology
import economy to export economy.
63
See Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 354.
64
See id. at art. 354.
65
Compare Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 354, with 2002 Technology
Regulations, supra note 12, at art. 27.
66
See Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 3.
58
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Contract Law, are specifically-tailored to technology transfer
agreements involving imported technology.67 The 2002 Technology Regulations—which prohibit grant-back clauses—are controlling.68
Article 329 of the Contract Law provides that technology contracts are invalid if they illegally monopolize, impede technological
progress, or infringe on technologies of others.69 To interpret Article 329, the Supreme People’s Court issued the Supreme
People’s Court’s Interpretation of Several Issues on Applying Law
to Trial of Cases of Technology Contract Dispute (“Judicial Interpretation”) on December 16, 2004.70 Article 10 of the Judicial Interpretation enumerates circumstances that render contract provisions invalid for “illegally monopolizing technology and impairing
technological progress” pursuant to Article 329 of the Contract
Law.71 This Judicial Interpretation provides that contract provisions are invalid if they restrict a party from using improved technologies, require one party to “gratuitously” provide the other party with the improved technology, or to transfer the improved technology to the other party non-reciprocally.72 Although never addressed directly, Article 329 of the Contract Law—in light of Article of 10 of the Judicial Interpretation—appears to make grantback clauses a per se violation, which aligns with the 2002 Technology Regulations.
The Supreme People’s Court applied Article 329 in Xiamen
Dayang Handiwork Co. v. Xiamen Huanghe Technology and Trading

67

See 2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 12.
See Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 355 (stating that, where other, relevant laws
or regulations differ with respect to technology import or export contracts or patent
contracts, those provisions prevail); see also Chow, supra note 1, at 519 (stating that the
chronological order of the promulgation of the two laws and the 2002 Technology
Regulations’ higher degree of specificity suggests that Article 27 of the 2002 Technology
Regulations is likely the controlling law on the issue).
69
See Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 329.
70
See Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Some Issues on
Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Disputes over Technology Contracts
(promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 16, 2004), CLI.2.38107(EN) (Lawinfochina), art
10.
71
See id.
72
See id.
68
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Co..73 In Xiamen Dayang Handiwork, the licensor required the licensee to purchase the licensor’s equipment, even though it was
seemingly unrelated to the licensed technology.74 This provision is
analogous to a grant-back clause in that both mandate actions by
the licensee for the benefit of the licensor. Admittedly, a grant-back
clause may impact both parties in a more profound way because it
concerns the permanent ownership of technology. The court
upheld the contractual provision in Xiamen Dayang Handiwork,
finding that the licensor may require this kind of additional purchase for special equipment, and such a stipulation is not “contradictory to the provisions of any law or regulation.”75
It is unclear whether Article 329 encourages the transfer of
leading technologies and therefore serves China’s needs. No economic data exists to demonstrate Article 329’s effect on licensing.
3. The IP Abuse Guideline Rules of China’s State
Administration for Industry and Commerce
Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) applies to all monopolistic
practices within China and monopolistic practices occurring outside of China’s territory that impinges on economic competition
within China.76 On April 7, 2015, China’s State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”)77 released its long-awaited IP
Rights Guidelines to implement the AML against abuse of IP
rights.78 The promulgation of these IP Rights Guidelines is China’s
first attempt to address the abuse of IP rights under the AML,79
73

See Xiamen Dayang Handiwork Co. v. Xiamen Huanghe Tech. & Trading Co.
(大洋公司诉黄河公司专利实施许可合同纠纷案) [Dayang Company v. Huanghe
Company], 2004 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 9 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2004) (China).
74
See id.
75
Id.
76
Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Fan Iongduan Fa (中华人民共和国反垄) [AntiMonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 2 (China).
77
SAIC is responsible for “registration of enterprises (including foreign-invested
enterprises) . . . [and] entities or individuals engaged in business operation . . . .” Mission,
ST. ADMIN. INDUS. & COM. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA, http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/
aboutus/Mission/index.html [http://perma.cc/7XFB-YDZ2] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
78
IP Rights Guidelines, supra note 53.
79
See MICHAEL GU, ANJIE LAW FIRM, BRIEF COMMENTS ON CHINA’S FIRST ANTIMONOPOLY REGULATION IN THE IP FIELD, http://en.anjielaw.com/downloadRepository/

2016]

A LONG-OVERDUE REFORM

755

and signals the SAIC’s intent to ramp up enforcement in IP licensing.80
Article 10 of the IP Rights Guidelines specifically prohibits certain unreasonable restrictive trading conditions that may constitute
an abuse, with exclusive grant-back clauses by companies with dominant market positions amongst the prohibited conditions.81
Therefore, absent a justifiable reason, grant-back clauses by companies with dominant market positions per se violate the AML, irrespective of proof of their anti-competitive or pro-competitive effects. The reference to “justifiable reason” might suggest that the
SAIC will review the abuse of grant-back clauses based on an analysis similar to rule of reason, which assesses the anti-competitive or
pro-competitive effects.82 However, it remains unknown how
much the SAIC will rely on the rule of reason analysis.83 Further,
since such a per se prohibition only governs licensors that occupy
dominant market positions, Article 10 is less sweeping than the
2002 Technology Regulations and possibly the Contract Law.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce believes that the IP Rights
Guidelines curtail patent owners’ interests and that patent owners,
in practice, are often foreign companies.84 When it submitted
comments on the eighth draft of the IP Rights Guidelines, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce criticized that the IP Rights Guidelines
“provide Chinese courts and SAIC with great discretion to intervene in patent licensing negotiations purely based on commercial
6df0e385-4dcb-45ee-945f-4a5c4388482c.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE8W-XNEN] (last
visited Mar. 13, 2016).
80
See MICHAEL HAN & RICHARD BIRD, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, CHINA’S
SAIC CONSULTS ON DRAFT RULES ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW
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considerations between the parties, and tilt the balance in favor of
the Chinese licensees . . . at the expense of the patent holder.”85
The final edition—the IP Rights Guidelines—“shows little change
from previous drafts.”86
B. The National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development
of Science and Technology (2006–2020)
In February 2006, the State Council unveiled a landmark document—the MLP.87 The MLP envisions that China will establish a
full-fledged major research and development infrastructure system
by 2030.88 The MLP explicitly states that a key tool for China to
create its own IP will be through tweaking foreign technology, and
refers to indigenous innovation as “enhancing original innovation”
through co-innovation and re-innovation “based on the assimilation . . . of imported technologies.”89 However, the legal definitions
of “co-innovation” and “re-innovation” remain unclear.90 Not
only does the MLP encourage co-innovation and re-innovation, it
“also warns against blindly importing foreign technology without
plans to transform it into Chinese technology.”91 The MLP states,
“[O]ne should be clearly aware that importation of technology
without emphasizing the assimilation, absorption, and reinnovation is bound to weaken the nation’s indigenous [research
and development] capacity.”92 President Hu referred to the approach as “innovation with Chinese characteristics.”93 Although
85
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not specified, the legal authority of re-innovation may lie in the
prohibition on grant-back clauses.
This policy has allowed China to increase its market power in
key emerging science and technology markets,94 however, the MLP
also led to a backlash from foreign governments and companies.95
In 2011, under mounting pressure from foreign companies, governments, and trade lobbies, China’s State Council abolished the
policy of “forcing” foreign companies to transfer their IP to Chinese companies to bid for government contracts.96
C. The TRIPS Agreement and China’s WTO Commitments
There is currently no international treaty that directly addresses technology transfer, and the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) does not regulate technology transfer.97 Although the
WTO regulates trades in technology under the Agreement on
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”), it merely sets forth minimum standards for IP rights, leaving regulation of technology transfer to individual countries.98
The TRIPS Agreement, however, does create a legal obligation
for developed countries to help promote and encourage “technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable
them to create a sound and viable technological base.”99 According
to the TRIPS Agreement, “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
94
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technology . . . .”100 Importantly, “developed country Members
shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing
and least-developed country Members.”101 Notably, China is not
one of the least-developed countries recognized by the WTO, and
there is no WTO definition of “developing” countries.102
When China joined the WTO in 2001, it committed that “the
terms and conditions of technology transfer, particularly in the
context of an investment, should be agreed between the parties to
the investment without government interference.”103 The 2002
Technology Regulations potentially raise an issue under China’s
WTO commitments because the regulations treat foreign companies and domestic companies differently. Particularly, the 2002
Technology Regulations only apply to technology imports where
foreign licensors transfer technologies to Chinese licensees and do
not apply to exports where Chinese licensors transfer technologies
to foreign licensees.104
III.

COMPARATIVE APPROACH

A. How It Works in Totality: Looking at Other Laws
1. Indemnification Provision
Article 24 (“indemnification provision”) of the 2002 Technology Regulations provides that if the licensor’s use of the technology, as agreed in the contract, infringes a third party’s rights and
interests, the licensor shall bear the liability.105 It results in foreign
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licensors’ non-negotiable statutory obligation to indemnify licensees
for third-party infringement claims.106
The indemnification provision is similar to the prohibition on
grant-back clauses because both provisions are mandatory. Thus, a
violation of the indemnification provision is arguably per se illegal
under Article 329 of the Contract Law.107 However, the grant-back
regime differs from the indemnification provision because it creates
ownership uncertainties, thereby restricting possibilities of true
collaboration between the parties, while the indemnification provision merely deals with price-related cost.108
2. Antitrust Law
a) Qualcomm
On February 9, 2015, the National Development and Reform
Commission (“NDRC”)109 fined Qualcomm—a U.S.-leading chip
manufacturer—a record $975 million for abusive patent licensing
practices.110 The NDRC found that Qualcomm abused its dominant market position in three ways—excessive pricing, unfair
terms, and bundling—practices that are prohibited by the AML.111
Among these licensing practices, the practice that is the most akin
to grant-back clauses is cross-licensing condition. Under its crosslicensing condition, Qualcomm required its customers to grant
Qualcomm their own patent licenses for free but refused to reduce
royalties by the value of these licenses.112
The Qualcomm case “is a milestone in the ramp-up Chinese
antitrust law enforcement,” as it represents the highest fine to date
106
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in China.113 Further, the Qualcomm case put the NDRC “on a par
with other competition authorities around the world, such as the
European Commission, for having a reputation for taking strong
action against anticompetitive conduct by dominant companies.”114
The NDRC also imposed non-traditional “behavioral” remedies,
including calculating the royalty rates based on 65%—instead of
100%—of the wholesale price.115 The NDRC believed that such behavioral remedies would boost Chinese mobile device manufacturers by ensuring favorable licensing terms with Qualcomm.116
On the one hand, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has criticized the NDRC’s investigation as “designed to bias license negotiations in favor of would-be Chinese licensees.”117 On the other
hand, the Qualcomm case demonstrates that Chinese authorities
consider non-Chinese defendants interests in antitrust investigations because the outcome depends on the quality of arguments
and evidence submitted.118 More importantly, the Qualcomm case
demonstrates that the Chinese antitrust authorities are willing to
adopt creative remedies that foreign companies propose.119 Indeed,
Qualcomm “only agreed to slight modifications in its royalty rates
in China,” which “can be looked at as nothing but a win for Qualcomm.”120
In 2014, Qualcomm received $13.2 billion in revenue from Chinese companies, constituting almost half of its $26.5 billion total
revenue.121 Steve Mollenkopf, Qualcomm’s CEO, acknowledged
113
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that the antitrust probe was a major source of uncertainty about
Qualcomm’s future.122
b) Huawei Technologies v. InterDigital
InterDigital is an American company that designs and develops
advanced technologies for wireless communications, and it owns
patents on international wireless communications standards.123 In
October 2013, the Guangdong High Court of China held that InterDigital abused its dominant market position in the licensing of
standard essential patents (“SEPs”) for 3G wireless communications because InterDigital sought injunctive relief in the United
States against Huawai, which is a willing licensee.124
Qiu Yongqing, the Chief Judge of the Guangdong Higher
People’s Court, suggested that Chinese enterprises should follow
Huawei’s footsteps and bravely employ anti-monopoly lawsuits to
break technology barriers and win space for development.125 However, Judge Qiu’s comment has received criticisms that Chinese
courts pay more attention to industrial policy concerns than the
legal merits of the case.126
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B. International Perspectives: Grant-Back Regimes in Other
Jurisdictions
In most countries, technology transfer is subject to some form
of competition law because licensing IP rights in technology transfers may extend the monopoly to the licensees, thereby creating
anticompetitive effects detrimental to the local economy.127 Below,
the competition laws of the United States and the European Union
are compared with that of China.
1. The United States: Rule of Reason
In the United States, grant-back clauses are not per se illegal
but rather are evaluated under the “rule of reason.”128 The 1995
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property indicate that, in applying the rule of reason, anticompetitive effects
should be balanced against offsetting pro-competitive effects.129
Anticompetitive effects include reducing the licensee’s incentive to
invest in improving the licensed technology while pro-competitive
effects include allowing the parties to share risks and compensating
the licensor for making improvements.130 An important factor of
the assessment is the licensor’s market power in the relevant market.131 In practice, IP licensing practices are rigorous in the United
States, resulting in great revenues.132
The rule of reason would not be entirely practicable in China
because Chinese courts do not play as prominent of a role in establishing the law as U.S. courts do. Instead of being one of the three
equal branches of the government, Chinese courts are viewed as
subordinate to the legislative branch and part of the Communist
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Party.133 Consequently, Chinese court decisions have limited authority and little precedential value.134
Although the rule of reason does not fit into China’s legal system perfectly, it nonetheless sheds light on how China should restructure its grant-back regime. China should make the rule of reason the default rule for non-severable improvements.135 Since the
rule of reason is part of antitrust law, it is less restrictive than Article 329 of the Contract Law.136 Regardless, the rule of reason effectively invalidates any abuse of the relaxed grant-back regime.
2. The European Union: Severable Versus Non-Severable
Improvements
European Community Regulation 772/2004 distinguishes between “non-severable” improvements and “severable” improvements.137 Severable improvements can be used without using the
original licensed patent, while non-severable improvements cannot
be used without using the original patent.138 On the one hand, E.U.
law prohibits grant-back clauses on severable improvements, with
licensees owning severable improvements.139 On the other hand,
E.U. law allows grant-back clauses on non-severable improvements,140 differing from China’s prohibition on grant-back clauses.
In China, if the Chinese licensee makes a non-severable improvement and subsequently obtains a patent for that improvement, once
the licensing agreement expires, the Chinese licensee may hinder
the foreign licensor’s ability to use the original patent in China.141
China’s prohibition on grant-back clauses is more restrictive and
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protective of the licensees, while E.U. law is more technical and
precise.142
China should adopt the E.U. model, prohibiting grant-back
clauses on severable improvements.143 Many argue that E.U. competition law is the most sophisticated in the world.144 The European Commission constantly studies, revises, and fine-tunes E.U.
competition laws based on its acquired experience.145 More importantly, China has previously borrowed from E.U. competition law,
rather than U.S. law, in creating its model modern competition
law.146 This is in part because China has adopted a civil law system
that is similar to the E.U. system, where statutes and regulations
are the primary sources in establishing laws.147
Notably, a distinction exists regarding the ultimate authority in
interpreting laws. In China, the final authority on most issues regarding competition law is the powerful MOFCOM.148 In contrast,
although the European Commission plays an important role in implementing its competition laws, the ultimate implementing authority lies in the Court of Justice of the European Communities, a
high court.149 Therefore, aside from distinguishing severable and
non-severable improvements, China should subject any abuse of
the relaxed grant-back regime for non-severable improvements to
the rule of reason under the AML.150
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CHINA SHOULD REFORM ITS CURRENT GRANT-BACK
REGIME

A. China Should Continue to Prohibit Grant-Back Clauses on
Severable Improvements
Since the European Union’s approach is well received and
China has followed many E.U. models, China should adopt their
approach in distinguishing severable and non-severable improvements.151 China should not relax its grant-back regime all at once.
As SAIC acknowledged in 2013, China was not ready for full-blown
and tailored antitrust guidelines because China had only been enforcing the AML in the IP field for a brief period of time and thus
lacked experience.152
B. China Should Make Grant-Back Clauses on Non-Severable
Improvements Non-Mandatory and Evaluate Potential Abuse
Under the Rule of Reason of the Antitrust Law
China’s current mandatory grant-back regime is too restrictive.153 Therefore, the default rule for non-severable improvements
should be non-mandatory, where parties are free to decide the
ownership of improvements. Any potential abuse of this nonmandatory grant-back rule should be subject to antitrust law. This
is because grant-back clauses have both pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects.154 Grant-back clauses may be pro-competitive
because they promote innovation and subsequent licensing by providing a means for the licensee and the licensor to share risks and
by rewarding the licensor for making further innovation based on
the licensed technology.155 Grant-back clauses may also be procompetitive if they substantially reduce the licensee’s incentives to
engage in research and development.156 Indeed, other countries in-
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clude their grant-back regime as part of the antitrust law.157 Further, China should adopt the United States’ rule of reason when
assessing abuse because the United States’ high revenues from IP
licensing prove that the rule of reason is well functional.158
C. China Should Apply Its Grant-Back Rules to Foreign and Domestic
Companies Equally and Fairly
China’s grant-back regime is too protective of the recipient of
the technology (usually a Chinese business entity), giving Chinese
licensees unfair advantages.159 China essentially uses state coercion
to obtain technology transfer. Particularly, the 2002 Technology
Regulations only prohibit grant-back clauses by foreign licensors
but not Chinese licensors, which might have compromised China’s
WTO commitments.160 Wang Xiaoye, a Chinese legal scholar, argues that China’s technology transfer regime does not adequately
take the licensor’s interests into account and imposes unreasonable
restrictions on the licensor.161
Further, foreign companies often feel pressure to cultivate relationships with enforcement authorities such as MOFCOM because, in practice, MOFCOM is the final authority with a broad
discretion on technology transfer issues.162 Cultivating relationships, while necessary, brings additional risks as China has a culture of corruption.163 In fact, China’s antitrust law has already
raised concerns at the highest levels of the U.S. government. In
December 2014, President Obama raised concerns directly to President Xi.164 White House National Security Council spokesman
Patrick Ventrell explained, “The United States government is concerned that China is using numerous mechanisms, including anti157
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monopoly law, to lower the value of foreign-owned patents and
benefit Chinese firms employing foreign technology.”165
China’s unequal treatment to Chinese and foreign companies
has compromised China’s reputation. As a result, Chinese companies encountered difficulties when entering foreign markets. For
example, in 2004, when Lenovo (a Chinese company) proposed to
purchase IBM’s personal computer division, the U.S. Congress
strongly opposed the transaction.166 Hostility against Chinese companies re-emerged in 2005 when COMCC (another Chinese company) attempted to acquire Unocal (a U.S. petroleum firm).167
Confronted with strong reactions by U.S. politicians, this transaction was not consummated.168 As a result, many Chinese companies criticized the United States for denying Chinese companies’
fair access to the United States market for fear of competition.169
D. China Should Reform Its Grant-Back Regime Now Rather Than
Later
In the past, China justified its prohibition on grant-back clauses
by characterizing itself as a developing country.170 China’s highly
restrictive grant-back provision has become a remnant of a bygone
era during which time China did not trust foreign companies.171 As
recently as two decades ago, China was a developing country just
starting on the path of industrialization. China was afraid that crafty and experienced business-minded foreign companies would exploit inexperienced Chinese businesses.172 This attitude may have
led to such a sweeping prohibition on grant-back clauses that requires an absolute warranty from foreign licensors.
Today, however, this distrust in foreign companies is outdated.
As the world’s second largest economy, China has many sophisticated businesspersons who are experienced in dealing with foreign
165
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companies.173 China has made impressive progress in technology
intensive and high-end manufacturing through technology transfer.174 Although the grant-back regime may have previously helped
Chinese companies gain market power as importers, it now hurts
China’s reputation in international trades,175 thereby limiting China’s potential for technology export in the future.
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